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In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) allows secure communications between two parties
based on physical laws. However, most of the security proofs of QKD today make unrealistic
assumptions and neglect many relevant device imperfections. As a result, they cannot guarantee
the security of the practical implementations. Recently, the loss-tolerant protocol (K. Tamaki et al,
Phys. Rev. A, 90, 052314, 2014) was proposed to make QKD robust against state preparation flaws.
This protocol relies on the emission of qubit systems which, unfortunately, is difficult to achieve in
practice. In this work, we remove such qubit assumption and generalise the loss-tolerant protocol
to accommodate multiple optical modes in the emitted signals. These multiple optical modes could
arise, for example, from Trojan horse attacks and/or device imperfections. Our security proof
determines some dominant device parameter regimes needed for achieving secure communication,
and therefore it can serve as a guideline to characterise QKD transmitters. Furthermore, we compare
our approach with that of Lo and Preskill (H.-K. Lo et al, Quantum Inf. Comput., 7, 431-458,
2007) and identify which method provides the highest secret key generation rate as a function of
the device imperfections. Our work constitutes an important step towards the best practical and
secure implementation for QKD.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–3] enables two distant parties, Alice and Bob, to share a common secret key
that can be used to encrypt and decrypt messages. In theory, QKD can offer information-theoretic security based on
the laws of physics. In practise, however, it does not because typical security proofs of QKD require assumptions that
are not actually met by the practical implementations, as they usually ignore many experimental device imperfections.
This discrepancy between the theory and the practice of QKD has been evidenced by many quantum hacking attacks,
especially by those that exploit flaws in the detectors of QKD systems [4, 5]. Fortunately, the proposal of measurement-
device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [6] can solve all security loopholes in the measurement unit, and therefore Eve
cannot take advantage of detector side-channels to learn information about the key. Furthermore, MDI-QKD can
be implemented experimentally using standard optical components [7–12]. Therefore, to guarantee implementation
security we now need to focus on how to secure the source in QKD.
Ideally, the sending devices are single-photon sources and the encoding of the light pulses is executed perfectly,
without any state preparation flaw (SPF). However, none of these two conditions are met experimentally since all
devices have inherent deficiencies. The decoy-state method [13–15] was proposed to replace single-photon sources
with coherent light sources. Also, by using the Gottesman-Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) security analysis [16] the
problem with SPFs is fixed. The main drawback of this last approach is that the resulting secret key rate is poor
and fragile against channel loss. This is because it assumes the worst case scenario in which Eve could enhance the
signals’ flaws through channel loss, which significantly decreases the performance of the QKD scheme.
Recently, a protocol that is loss-tolerant to SPFs has been proposed [17] to address the limitation of the GLLP
analysis. The loss-tolerant protocol employs only three states and takes into account modulation errors due to an
imperfect phase modulator (PM). Remarkably, by using a different phase error estimation technique involving the
use of the basis mismatched events, the secret key rate of the loss-tolerant protocol remains almost unchanged even
if the SPFs increase. In fact, the maximum transmission distance for a QKD system in fiber so far has been recently
achieved using this protocol [18], which shows that the loss-tolerant protocol is highly practical. Its main weakness,
however, is the assumption that the single-photon signals sent by Alice are qubits, which is difficult to guarantee
in practice. For instance, if Eve conducts a Trojan horse attack (THA) [19–23] against the source, this assumption
can be violated. In a THA, Eve sends bright light into Alice’s PM and obtains information about the encoding by
measuring the back-reflected light that exits Alice’s lab. Moreover, an optical mode of the light pulse emitted by
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2Alice could be dependent on the value of the phase modulation, which means that a sent single-photon pulse might
not be a qubit (we call this imperfection the non-qubit assumption). That is, Alice’s setting choice information could
be encoded in other degrees of freedom of the emitted light, and this spontaneous leakage of information results in a
higher-dimensional sending state.
This work aims to reduce the big gap between the theory and the practice of QKD by generalising the loss-tolerant
protocol such that it can include typical imperfections in the sending device. To be precise, and in contrast to [17],
here we remove the qubit assumption and include the effect of side-channels by considering the mode dependency
of the PM and THAs. Moreover, like in [17], we also include in the analysis SPFs in a single-mode qubit subspace.
Therefore, our analysis covers dominant imperfections that a source device has, allowing the use of a much wider class
of imperfect devices in a secure manner. Our generalised loss-tolerant protocol can be applied to any multi-mode
scenario as long as the states of the emitted signals are independently and identically distributed (I.I.D.), namely, this
proof does not consider correlations between the sending signals. However, we remark that recent results reported
in [24] imply that our analysis could also accommodate correlations between the signals which are independent of
Alice’s setting choice. Furthermore, we emphasise that the basic idea is rather general, and can be applied to many
other QKD protocols like, for instance, the six-state protocol [25], distributed-phase-reference protocols [26–28] and
MDI-QKD [6]. In simple terms, it is a formalism to estimate the phase error rate of a QKD protocol by evaluating the
transmission rates of some virtual states with the help of the state structure of Alice’s signals (see Eq. (1) below). We
also emphasise that our method does not require a complete characterisation of the side-channels, which significantly
simplifies the experiments for characterising the source. Using this formalism, we can quantify the device parameters
required to ensure secure communications with flawed and leaky sources.
Additionally, we investigate how Lo-Preskill’s security analysis [29] behaves in the presence of the same device’s
imperfections and, by using imperfectly characterised states, we compare it with our generalised loss-tolerant protocol.
As a result, we determine which security proof provides a higher secret key rate as a function of the device parameters.
These parameters are essential for experimentalists to produce and to calibrate the transmitting devices, and therefore
our work can be used as a guideline for securing the source in the presence of multi-mode signals.
This paper is organised as follows. In section II, we describe the assumptions that we make in our security proof and
introduce the QKD protocol considered. In section III, we present the security analysis for our generalised loss-tolerant
protocol. Then, in section IV, we consider a particular device model to perform the simulations for our analysis and
in order to compare it with Lo-Preskill’s analysis. Finally, we conclude our paper in section V and provide additional
explanations and calculations in the Appendixes.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROTOCOL
We shall assume, for simplicity, that Alice’s lab has a single-photon source. However, we emphasise that our analysis
can also be applied to the case where Alice emits phase-randomised weak coherent pulses. In this latter case, Alice can
use the decoy-state method [13–15] to estimate all the quantities corresponding to the single-photon pulses which are
needed to apply our method. Below we focus on the case where Alice has at her disposal single-photon sources only
because the study with phase-randomised weak coherent pulses, together with decoy states, results in an unnecessarily
cumbersome analysis. Fig. 1 shows the QKD setup. Next, we describe the assumptions we make on Alice’s and Bob’s
devices.
A. Assumptions on Alice’s device
In this work, we consider the asymptotic scenario where Alice sends Bob an infinite number of pulses. Our formalism
is valid for any source that emits pulses whose quantum state is of the form
|Φjβ〉BE = ajβ |φjβ〉BE + bjβ |φ⊥jβ〉BE , (1)
with |ajβ |2 + |bjβ |2 = 1, where j ∈ {0, 1} and β ∈ {Z,X} are Alice’s bit value and basis choices respectively. As in
the loss-tolerant analysis introduced in [17], we consider a three-state protocol where Alice selects jβ ∈ {0Z, 1Z, 0X}.
Furthermore, in Eq. (1), we assume that |φjβ〉BE is a pure state in a single-mode qubit space, where BE stands for
Bob’s and Eve’s systems due to a potential THA. For instance, |φjβ〉BE could be of the form |φjβ〉BE = |ωjβ〉B⊗|〉E ,
where Eve’s system does not depend on jβ and |ωjβ〉B is a qubit state. The state |φ⊥jβ〉BE , on the other hand,
corresponds to any state outside of the single mode qubit space, including the state of a side-channel, and it is in an
Hilbert space orthogonal to |φjβ〉BE . We note that the form of the pure state given by Eq. (1) is the most general
3I.I.D. state. Indeed, this equation simply decomposes a state in a given Hilbert space into a direct sum of two states
in different Hilbert spaces, which can always be done. One of these states is in a qubit space and the other one is in
any complementary Hilbert space. That is, any pure state can be written in the form given by Eq. (1). In addition,
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FIG. 1: Each single-photon pulse emitted by Alice’s source goes through a 50:50 beamsplitter (BS) and is decomposed
into the reference and the signal pulses. The reference pulse travels through the longer arm of Alice’s Mach-Zehnder
interferometer. To perform the encoding, she uses a PM that applies a phase shift to the signal pulse. The two
pulses are recombined at the second 50:50 BS, sent through the quantum channel and then received in Bob’s lab.
On reception, they are split by a 50:50 BS and Bob applies a phase shift on the reference and signal pulses in the
upper arm of his Mach-Zehnder interferometer. These pulses then interfere with the pulses that travelled through the
shorter arm of the interferometer at the second 50:50 BS. Bob can then detect click events corresponding to photons
choosing the shortest arm in Alice’s interferometer and the longest one in Bob’s, and to the opposite, by using two
detectors, D0 and D1, which correspond to obtaining bit value 0 and 1 respectively.
we further assume that, like in [17], the states |φjβ〉BE in Eq. (1) form a triangle in the Bloch sphere, and we set their
Y -components to be the same by choosing the Y -axis appropriately. This assumption is required to ensure that Alice
is sending essentially three different states, rather than one or two states. Importantly, we note that by introducing
an ancilla system for Alice to purify the state, our formalism is also valid for a mixed state in a single-mode qubit
space, as shown in Appendix B.
The state structure in Eq. (1) means that the inner product 〈φjβ |φ⊥j′β′〉BE for all j, j′, β and β′ is always zero.
Also, depending on Alice’s knowledge about the state given in Eq. (1) she might have to consider the worst-case
scenario, i.e., 〈φ⊥jβ |φ⊥j′β′〉BE = 0 for any combination of (j, β) and (j′, β′). This means that, complete information
about |φ⊥jβ〉 is not required, which significantly simplifies the experiments for characterising the source. On the other
hand, if Alice knows some structure of the side-channel she should fully exploit it and lower bound 〈φ⊥jβ |φ⊥j′β′〉BE . For
example, if she knows that the side-channel is associated with the polarisation state of the single-mode qubit then
the worst case scenario does not apply, i.e., 〈φ⊥jβ |φ⊥j′β′〉BE 6= 0, since it is impossible for three states to be orthogonal
to each other given the two-dimensionality of polarisation. This way, our formalism can readily take into account the
available information.
We remark that, to apply the procedure introduced below we only need to determine the coefficients ajβ and bjβ ,
and the qubit state, but it is not necessary to completely characterise the quantum information of the side-channel,
|φ⊥jβ〉BE . That is, our characterisation seems to be rather simple, and there is no need to perform further detailed
characterisations. Nonetheless, the better Alice and Bob know the state given in Eq. (1), the better the resulting
performance, as explained later in Section IV. An experimental procedure to perform this estimation is out of the
scope of this paper hence, we assume that these parameters are given.
Furthermore, our work can accommodate any SPF in the single-mode qubit space, and one could also employ the
techniques in [24, 30]. For example, we may select a case in which the states that Alice prepares can be expressed as
1√
2
(
|1〉r |v〉s + eϕA+δϕA/pi |v〉r |1〉s
)
, (2)
where δ(≥ 0) is the deviation of the phase modulation from the intended value ϕA, and we define |1〉r |v〉s = |0Y 〉
and |v〉r |1〉s = |1Y 〉, where v stands for vacuum, |1〉 denotes a Fock state with one photon and the subscript r (s)
corresponds to the reference (signal) pulse. In the case of the three-state protocol we have that ϕA ∈ {0, pi, pi/2}.
4Then, by using |0Z〉 = (|0Y 〉+ |1Y 〉)/
√
2 and |1Z〉 = (− |0Y 〉+ |1Y 〉)/
√
2, we obtain the following expressions for the
three states in the single-mode qubit space:
|ω0Z〉B = |0Z〉 ,
|ω1Z〉B = − sin
(
δ
2
)
|0Z〉+ cos
(
δ
2
)
|1Z〉 ,
|ω0X〉B = cos
(
pi
4
+
δ
4
)
|0Z〉+ sin
(
pi
4
+
δ
4
)
|1Z〉 .
(3)
Therefore, our formalism can be used, for instance, when the information about Alice’s choice of state is leaked
and/or the optical mode depends on Alice’s selection. This leakage from the source can occur spontaneously or with
an active THA.
B. Assumptions on Bob’s device
Bob receives the signal and reference pulses from Alice and measures them in a basis selected at random. More
precisely, Bob’s measurements are defined by the positive-operator valued measures (POVMs) {Mˆ0β , Mˆ1β , Mˆf}, where
Mˆ0β (Mˆ1β) with β ∈ {X,Z} corresponds to obtaining the bit value 0 (1) when Bob chooses the basis β, and Mˆf
corresponds to an inconclusive outcome. Importantly, Mˆf is assumed to be the same for the two bases. This means
that the detection efficiencies are independent of Bob’s measurement basis choice, which is required to prevent side-
channel attacks exploiting channel loss [4, 5]. Note that, this assumption is widely used in most security proofs, and
one of the simplest ways to circumvent such detector side-channel attacks is to use MDI-QKD, to which our technique
also applies (see Appendix A).
C. Actual protocol
The three-state protocol makes an asymmetric choice of basis, namely, the Z and the X basis are selected with a
priori different probabilities for both Alice and Bob. The events when both of them select the Z basis are used for
key generation. Also, all announcements between Alice and Bob are done via an authenticated public channel. Next,
we describe the steps of the QKD protocol in detail.
1. Initialisation: Before running the protocol, Alice and Bob agree on a number Nfixed of rounds, on the error
correcting codes, and on a set of hash functions to perform privacy amplification. Steps 2-4 of the protocol are
repeated N times until the number of detected events N becomes Nfixed.
2. State preparation: Alice generates the states given in Eq. (1). First, she selects the basis β ∈ {Z,X} for
encoding the states with probabilities PZA and PXA = 1 − PZA respectively. If the Z basis is selected, she
randomly chooses a bit value. Then, Alice prepares the signal and reference pulses following these specifications
and sends the pulses to Bob via a quantum channel. Due to a potential THA, the sending states might contain
Eve’s system E as well.
3. Measurement: Bob measures each incoming signal using the basis β ∈ {Z,X} which he selects with proba-
bilities PZB and PXB = 1− PZB respectively.
4. Detection announcement: Bob checks whether the signal in Step 3 is detected or not. For each detected
event, N is increased by 1 unit1. If N = Nfixed, Bob announces the detected events, and they proceed to Step
5, otherwise they go back to Step 2.
5. Basis announcement and sifting: Alice and Bob announce their basis choices for the detected events. Also,
they define bit strings associated with the basis matched and mismatched events.
1 As proven in [31], one can employ this announcement and the setting independent termination condition as long as we use the Azuma’s
inequality [32]. Moreover, with the Azuma’s inequality, Alice and Bob can exchange the basis information for each round of the quantum
communication [31], which we do not adopt here for simplicity of the discussions.
56. Parameter estimation: Alice and Bob announce the bit strings ~sX,0Z , ~sX,1Z and ~sX,0X which correspond
to the events when Alice sends one of the three possible states and Bob measures it in the X basis. These bit
strings are used to estimate the number of bits that need to be removed from the sifted key, which is composed
by the Z basis matched events, during privacy amplification.
7. Error correction and privacy amplification: Alice and Bob randomly select an error correcting code from
Step 1 to perform error correction on these sifted strings and then they exchange the syndrome information
about the Z basis matched events. Then, based on the result of the parameter estimation in Step 6, they
perform privacy amplification on the corrected sifted keys. At the end of this step, Alice and Bob obtain the
key strings ~kZA and
~kZB , respectively.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In order to prove the information-theoretic security of our protocol we use the complementary scenario introduced
by Koashi [33, 34]. For this, we first need to create an equivalent virtual protocol (see Appendix B) concerning an
observable conjugate to the key. The classical and quantum information available to Eve in the actual and virtual
protocols are the same and therefore she cannot distinguish and behave differently between them. Hence, by proving
the security in the virtual protocol we ensure the security of the actual protocol. Additionally, from the virtual
protocol we can determine the phase error rate, which quantifies the amount of information that is leaked to Eve and
has to be removed in the privacy amplification step. In this section, we show how this last quantity is estimated by
generalising the loss-tolerant method.
A. Secret key rate
As explained before, for simplicity we assume the asymptotic scenario where Alice sends Bob an infinite number of
pulses. The asymptotic key rate for the single-photon signals can be expressed as
R ≥ YZ [1− h(eX)− fh(eZ)], (4)
where YZ is the yield of the single photons in the Z basis, i.e. the joint probability of Alice emitting a single-photon
in the Z basis and Bob detecting it with a measurement also in the Z basis. The function h(x) = −x log2(x)− (1−
x) log2(1− x) is the binary entropy function and f is the error correction efficiency. The term eX is the phase error
rate and thus, h(eX) is the cost of performing privacy amplification in order to remove the correlations between the
corrected sifted key and Eve. The term eZ is the bit error rate and fh(eZ) corresponds to the amount of syndrome
information required to make Alice’s and Bob’s keys the same. The quantities YZ and eZ in Eq. (4) can be directly
obtained from an implementation of the experiment. Therefore, we are left with the estimation of the phase error
rate. We do this below.
B. Estimation of the phase error rate
We assume that Alice prepares the states |Φjβ〉BE as defined in Eq. (1). These states take into consideration the
non-qubit assumption, a possible THA by Eve, and SPFs. In the virtual protocol (see Appendix B for further details),
Alice prepares the following state in the Z basis:
|ΨZ〉ABE =
1√
2
[
|0Z〉A ⊗
(
a0Z |φ0Z〉BE + b0Z |φ⊥0Z〉BE
)
+ |1Z〉A ⊗
(
a1Z |φ1Z〉BE + b1Z |φ⊥1Z〉BE
)]
. (5)
We then define the bit error rate as
eZ =
Y
(Z)
0Z,1Z + Y
(Z)
1Z,0Z
Y
(Z)
0Z,0Z + Y
(Z)
1Z,0Z + Y
(Z)
0Z,1Z + Y
(Z)
1Z,1Z
, (6)
where the yields Y
(Z)
sZ,jZ , with s, j ∈ {0, 1}, are the joint probabilities that Alice prepares the state |ΨZ〉ABE , Bob
selects the Z basis, and Alice (Bob) obtains the bit value j (s) when she (he) measures the system A (B) in the
6Z basis. Note that, the superscript (Z) in the yields represents the basis used in the state preparation while the
subscripts denote the bases employed in the measurements. These yields are directly observed in the experiment.
Similarly, the phase error rate is defined as
eX =
Y
(Z)vir
0X,1X + Y
(Z)vir
1X,0X
Y
(Z)vir
0X,0X + Y
(Z)vir
1X,0X + Y
(Z)vir
0X,1X + Y
(Z)vir
1X,1X
, (7)
where Y
(Z)vir
sX,jX , with s, j ∈ {0, 1}, is the joint probability that Alice prepares the state |ΨZ〉ABE , she and Bob select the
Z basis but both use the X basis for their measurements (rather than the selected Z basis), and Alice (Bob) obtains
the bit value j (s). The phase error rate corresponds to the bit error in the virtual protocol. Also, we have that the
denominator of eX in Eq.(7) is equal to Y
(Z)
0Z,0Z + Y
(Z)
1Z,0Z + Y
(Z)
0Z,1Z + Y
(Z)
1Z,1Z , since by assumption the probability to
obtain an inconclusive outcome associated to the operator Mˆf is the same for the both basis for any incoming state.
This means that to estimate eX we only need to calculate the virtual yields Y
(Z)vir
0X,1X and Y
(Z)vir
1X,0X .
In the virtual protocol, after Alice measures the system A in Eq. (5) in theX basis, she sends Bob the (unnormalised)
states:
θˆBE,jX,vir = TrA
[ |jX〉〈jX |A ⊗ 1ˆBE |ΨZ〉〈ΨZ |ABE ], (8)
where TrA is the partial trace over the virtual system A. Using Eqs. (5) and (8) we can calculate the unnormalised
states sent by Alice for j ∈ {0, 1} and obtain that θˆBE,jX,vir = |ψ〉〈ψ|BE,jX,vir with
|ψ〉BE,jX,vir =
1
2
[
a0Z |φ0Z〉BE + b0Z |φ⊥0Z〉BE + (−1)j
(
a1Z |φ1Z〉BE + b1Z |φ⊥1Z〉BE
)]
. (9)
Writing Eq. (9) in terms of the states |γjX〉BE and |γ⊥jX〉BE , defined below, we have that:
|ψ〉BE,jX,vir =
1
2
[√
|a0Z |2 + (−1)j
(
a∗0Za1Z〈φ0Z |φ1Z〉BE + a0Za∗1Z〈φ1Z |φ0Z〉BE
)
+ |a1Z |2 |γjX〉BE
+
√
|b0Z |2 + (−1)j
(
b∗0Zb1Z〈φ⊥0Z |φ⊥1Z〉BE + b0Zb∗1Z〈φ⊥1Z |φ⊥0Z〉BE
)
+ |b1Z |2 |γ⊥jX〉BE
]
,
(10)
where the normalised states |γjX〉BE have the form
|γjX〉BE =
a0Z |φ0Z〉BE + (−1)ja1Z |φ1Z〉BE√
|a0Z |2 + (−1)j
(
a∗0Za1Z〈φ0Z |φ1Z〉BE + a0Za∗1Z〈φ1Z |φ0Z〉BE
)
+ |a1Z |2
, (11)
and the normalised states |γ⊥jX〉BE , which are orthogonal to |γjX〉BE , are given by
|γ⊥jX〉BE =
b0Z |φ⊥0Z〉BE + (−1)jb1Z |φ⊥1Z〉BE√
|b0Z |2 + (−1)j
(
b∗0Zb1Z〈φ⊥0Z |φ⊥1Z〉BE + b0Zb∗1Z〈φ⊥1Z |φ⊥0Z〉BE
)
+ |b1Z |2
. (12)
Note that, in Eq. (10), we have decomposed |ψ〉BE,jX,vir into a single-mode qubit |γjX〉BE and a state in any mode
orthogonal to it, |γ⊥jX〉BE . This decomposition follows the definition provided in Eq. (1), and it is an essential step
for our estimation of the phase error rate.
To obtain the yields Y
(Z)vir
sX,jX we need to calculate
Y
(Z)vir
sX,jX = PZAPZB Tr
[
DˆsX θˆBE,jX,vir
]
, (13)
where DˆsX =
∑
k Aˆ
†
kMˆsXAˆk corresponds to Eve’s action, represented by the Kraus operators Aˆk, as well as Bob’s
measurement with MˆsX being an element of Bob’s POVM. Here, recall the definition of the phase error rate where
the Z basis is selected but both Alice and Bob use the X basis for their measurements (rather than the selected Z
basis), which is why PZA and PZB appear in Eq. (13). Moreover, here we assume, for simplicity, that Eve applies the
same quantum operation to every signal, which corresponds to a collective attack, but our analysis can be generalised
to coherent attacks by considering the Azuma’s inequality [32] (see Appendix B), which deals with any correlations
7among the events, i.e., the phase error rate pattern. Using Eqs. (10)-(13) we obtain the following expression for the
yields:
Y
(Z)vir
sX,jX = PZAPZB
(
Aj Tr
[
DˆsX |γjX〉〈γjX |BE
]
+ Tr
[
DˆsX
(
Bj
∣∣γjX〉〈γ⊥jX ∣∣BE +B∗j ∣∣γ⊥jX〉〈γjX ∣∣BE + Cj ∣∣γ⊥jX〉〈γ⊥jX ∣∣BE )]), (14)
where the coefficients Aj , Bj , and Cj are defined in Appendix C, and we omit presenting their explicit expressions
here for simplicity. Since the state |γjX〉BE in the first term of Eq. (14) is a single-mode qubit state, its density
matrix can be expressed as
ρˆjX = |γjX〉〈γjX |BE =
1
2
∑
i
P jX,viri σˆi, (15)
where P jX,viri are the coefficients of the Bloch vector and σˆi, with i ∈ {Id, x, y, z}, represent the identity and the
three Pauli operators, respectively. Therefore, we have that
Aj Tr
[
DˆsX |γjX〉〈γjX |BE
]
= Aj
[
P jX,virId qsX|Id + P
jX,vir
x qsX|x + P
jX,vir
y qsX|y + P
jX,vir
z qsX|z
]
, (16)
where P jX,viri = Tr
[
σˆi |γjX〉〈γjX |BE
]
and qsX|i = 12 Tr
[
DˆsX σˆi
]
can be regarded as the transmission rates of the
operator σˆi. These can be calculated by solving a system of linear equations with the events from the actual protocol,
which we will explain later. Moreover, by choosing the y axis of the Bloch sphere appropriately we can always set
P jX,viry = 0 for all the Bloch vectors, since the PM just creates rotations in the X-Z plane of the Bloch sphere.
Indeed, even if the PM introduces loss depending on Alice’s state selection, as long as the three states form a triangle
in the Bloch sphere, we can apply such simplification [17]. As already mentioned in Section II, we note that any
implementation of the loss-tolerant protocol requires that the three states form a triangle in the Bloch sphere.
Furthermore, it is possible to find both lower and upper bounds on the second term of Eq. (14). In particular, this
term can be written as Tr
[
DˆsXNj
]
where Nj is the matrix
[
Cj B
∗
j
Bj 0
]
with eigenvalues
λmaxj =
Cj +
√
Cj
2 + 4|Bj |2
2
and λminj =
Cj −
√
Cj
2 + 4|Bj |2
2
. (17)
Using the properties of POVMs we have that the operators DˆsX have eigenvalues between 0 and 1, therefore
Tr
[
DˆsXNj
]
is bounded by λminj ≤ Tr
[
DˆsXNj
]
≤ λmaxj , since λminj is negative.
This means that the virtual yields satisfy:
PZAPZB
(
Aj
[
qsX|Id + P jX,virx qsX|x + P
jX,vir
z qsX|z
]
+ λminj
)
≤ Y (Z)virsX,jX
≤ PZAPZB
(
Aj
[
qsX|Id + P jX,virx qsX|x + P
jX,vir
z qsX|z
]
+ λmaxj
)
.
(18)
To find the transmission rates qsX|i, the actual events we need to consider are those associated with the yields
Y
(Z)
sX,0Z , Y
(Z)
sX,1Z and Y
(X)
sX,0X . These are defined as Y
(β)
sX,jβ = PjβPXB Tr
[
DˆsX |Φjβ〉〈Φjβ |BE
]
for jβ ∈ {0Z, 1Z, 0X},
where the normalised actual states |Φjβ〉BE are defined in Eq. (1). That is, |Φjβ〉BE are the states emitted by Alice
in the actual protocol when she chooses the bit value j and the basis β, in the presence of multi-mode signals. Using
exactly the same method explained above, we obtain
Y
(β)
sX,jβ = PjβPXB
(
Ejβ Tr
[
DˆsX |φjβ〉〈φjβ |BE
]
+ Tr
[
DˆsX
(
Fjβ
∣∣φjβ〉〈φ⊥jβ∣∣BE + F ∗jβ ∣∣φ⊥jβ〉〈φjβ∣∣BE +Gjβ ∣∣φ⊥jβ〉〈φ⊥jβ∣∣BE )]), (19)
where Ejβ = |ajβ |2, Fjβ = ajβb∗jβ , F ∗jβ = a∗jβbjβ and Gjβ = |bjβ |2. Therefore, we find that the actual yields satisfy
PjβPXB
(
Ejβ
[
qsX|Id + P jβx qsX|x + P
jβ
z qsX|z
]
+ λminjβ
)
≤ Y (β)sX,jβ
≤ PjβPXB
(
Ejβ
[
qsX|Id + P jβx qsX|x + P
jβ
z qsX|z
]
+ λmaxjβ
)
,
(20)
8where
λmaxjβ =
Gjβ +
√
G2jβ + 4|Fjβ |2
2
and λminjβ =
Gjβ −
√
G2jβ + 4|Fjβ |2
2
, (21)
are the eigenvalues for the non-qubit part of the actual states and, P jβx and P
jβ
z are the coefficients of the Bloch
vector for the actual states. By substituting jβ ∈ {0Z, 1Z, 0X} in Eqs. (20) and (21), we obtain a system of three
linear inequalities, which can be expressed as[
qsX|Id, qsX|x, qsX|z
]
Aˆ+
[
λmin0Z , λmin1Z , λmin0X
] ≤ [ Y (Z)sX,0Z
P0ZPXB
,
Y
(Z)
sX,1Z
P1ZPXB
,
Y
(X)
sX,0X
P0XPXB
]
≤ [qsX|Id, qsX|x, qsX|z] Aˆ+ [λmax0Z , λmax1Z , λmax0X ] , (22)
where Aˆ := (V T0Z , V
T
1Z , V
T
0X) in which Vjβ = Ejβ(1, P
jβ
x , P
jβ
z ) and where the superscript T means transpose. By
rearranging Eq. (22) we obtain the bounds on the transmission rates qsX|Id, qsX|x, and qsX|z to be([
Y
(Z)
sX,0Z
P0ZPXB
,
Y
(Z)
sX,1Z
P1ZPXB
,
Y
(X)
sX,0X
P0XPXB
]
− [λmax0Z , λmax1Z , λmax0X ]) ˆA−1 ≤ [qsX|Id, qsX|x, qsX|z]
≤
([
Y
(Z)
sX,0Z
P0ZPXB
,
Y
(Z)
sX,1Z
P1ZPXB
,
Y
(X)
sX,0X
P0XPXB
]
− [λmin0Z , λmin1Z , λmin0X ]) ˆA−1, (23)
where Aˆ−1 is the inverse of the matrix Aˆ.
By solving Eq. (23), we can calculate the transmission rates and then substitute them into Eq. (18) to find the
upper bounds on the virtual yields Y
(Z)vir
0X,1X and Y
(Z)vir
1X,0X . Finally, by using these upper bounds on the virtual yields
and the yields from the actual events we can estimate the phase error rate eX in Eq. (7).
As already mentioned previously, this technique is quite general and could be applied to many other QKD protocols.
As an example, in Appendix A we outline how this analysis could be performed for MDI-QKD.
IV. SIMULATION OF THE KEY RATE
A. Particular device model
Only for the purpose of the simulation, we now consider a particular device model and a particular THA. In general,
to experimentally guarantee that the three states emitted by Alice remain in two dimensions, i.e., in a single-mode
qubit, her PM needs to have the same temporal, spectral, spatial and polarisation mode independently of the bit and
basis choices. However, due to imperfections in the devices this condition is hard to fulfil. Some counter-measures
against these imperfections have been suggested [35–38], but they cannot rigorously ensure a single-mode qubit.
Therefore, it is crucial to consider how device’s flaws can be taken into account in a security proof. This is the aim
of our analysis. For simplicity, among many imperfections, we select the polarisation mode as an example of how to
use our framework.
A change in polarisation can arise from the imperfect alignment of the laser with the principal axis of the PM and/or
when the PM is polarisation dependent, i.e., the state of polarisation of the signals prepared might be different for
each encoding phase value. In principle, this could be avoided by using a polarisation beam splitter (PBS) that selects
a single polarisation mode. In practice, however, because of the finite extinction ratio of the PBS this is usually not
the case. Here, we relax the need for a perfect PBS by considering a polarisation multi-mode scenario. We remark,
nonetheless, that our analysis can be applied to any multi-mode scenario. Using our formalism, we can express the
states sent by Alice in the scenario considered in an analogous way to Eq. (1):
|Ωjβ〉B = cos θjβ |ωjβ〉HB + sin θjβ |ωjβ〉V B , (24)
for jβ ∈ {0Z, 1Z, 0X}, where the subscripts H and V refer to the horizontal and vertical polarisation modes, respec-
tively. That is, now the polarisation state of |ωjβ〉B depends on Alice’s bit and basis choices instead of being the same
independently of her encoding. Next, we add the SPF and the THA to this particular device model.
For the states |ωjβ〉HB and |ωjβ〉V B we use the definitions in Eq. (3), where they both live in a qubit space. Also,
by using Eq. (3) these states already include SPFs whenever the parameter δ > 0. As stressed in Section II, since
in this case we know the form of the states we do not need to consider the worst case scenario but only the inner
product 〈ωjβ |ωj′β′〉HB VB = 0 for all j, j′, β and β′.
9Additionally, we consider an active information leakage in our device model. For this, we assume that Eve sends
strong light into Alice’s PM, which is then back-reflected and exits Alice’s lab in the form
|ξjβ〉E = CI |e〉E + CD |ejβ〉E . (25)
In this expression, |CI |2 + |CD|2 = 1, and |e〉E (|ejβ〉E) represents (represent) the setting independent (dependent)
state (states) on Alice’s bit and basis choice, where we assume that 〈e|ejβ〉E = 0. That is, the state |e〉E (|ejβ〉E)
provides Eve with no (some) information about Alice’s bit and basis values each given time. Therefore, our model
for the THA can be parameterised by only two parameters, CI and CD, and no further detailed information is
needed to apply our analysis. For instance, when we increase isolation on Alice’s sending device, the independent
component increases and Eve obtains less information about the states being sent. Moreover, in the absence of further
information about the states |ejβ〉E , we assume the worst case scenario where these states are orthogonal to each
other, i.e., 〈ejβ |ej′β′〉E = 0 for any (j, β) 6= (j′, β′). Clearly, if Alice and Bob know the states |ejβ〉E , this information
can be trivially included in the formalism below.
If |ξjβ〉E is say, for instance, a coherent state, |e〉E is the vacuum state (i.e., |e〉E = |v〉E), CI = e−µ/2 and CD =√
1− e−µ, where µ is the intensity of Eve’s back reflected light. In this case, note that the condition 〈ejβ |ej′β′〉E = 0
is not satisfied since Eve will never be able to perfectly distinguish the states dependent on Alice’s encoding. The
value of this overlap depends on the isolation of the devices. Below, however, we conservatively assume for simplicity
the worst case scenario where this overlap is zero.
Putting Eq. (24) and Eq. (25) together, Alice’s emitted state for the single photon pulses is modelled as
|Φjβ〉BE = |Ωjβ〉B ⊗ |ξjβ〉E . (26)
By using Eqs. (3)-(24)-(25)-(26) and by assuming that |ξjβ〉E are coherent states, we obtain
|Φjβ〉BE =
(
cos θjβ |ωjβ〉HB + sin θjβ |ωjβ〉V B
)⊗ (CI |v〉E + CD |ejβ〉E )
= cos θjβCI |ωjβ〉HB |v〉E + cos θjβCD |ωjβ〉HB |ejβ〉E + sin θjβ |ωjβ〉V B ⊗
(
CI |v〉E + CD |ejβ〉E
)
.
(27)
The first term of Eq. (27) has polarisation H and is insensitive to the THA, it corresponds to ajβ |φjβ〉BE in Eq. (1).
Similarly, the other terms have either polarisation V and/or are affected by the THA, and together they correspond
to bjβ |φ⊥jβ〉BE in Eq. (1). In this case, the unnormalised virtual states given by Eq. (10) have now the form
|ψ〉BE,jX,vir =
1
2
[
CI
√
cos θ20Z − (−1)j 2 cos θ0Z cos θ1Z sin
δ
2
+ cos θ21Z |γjX〉BE
+
√
C2I
(
sin θ20Z − (−1)j 2 sin θ0Z sin θ1Z sin
δ
2
+ sin θ21Z
)
+ 2C2D |γ⊥jX〉BE
]
,
(28)
where we have used the relationship 〈ω0Z |ω1Z〉B = 〈ω0Z |ω1Z〉B = − sin
(
δ
2
)
. In order to estimate the phase error rate,
we need to calculate the transmission rates qsX|Id, qsX|x and qsX|z using the actual yields. For this, we use Eq. (23)
where in this particular example, the matrix Aˆ is
Aˆ =
E0Z E1Z E0X0 −E1Z sin(δ) E0X sin(pi/2 + δ/2)
E0Z −E1Z cos(δ) E0X cos(pi/2 + δ/2)
 , (29)
where Ejβ = C
2
I cos
2 θjβ . Then, we can find the virtual yields by using Eq. (18) where, in this example, the coefficients
of the Bloch vectors are
P jX,virx =
(−1)j 2 cos θ0Z cos θ1Z cos δ2 − 2 cos θ21Z cos δ2 sin δ2
cos θ20Z − (−1)j 2 cos θ0Z cos θ1Z sin δ2 + cos θ21Z
,
P jX,virz =
cos θ20Z − (−1)j 2 cos θ0Z cos θ1Z sin δ2 + cos θ21Z
(
1− 2 cos2 δ2
)
cos θ20Z − (−1)j 2 cos θ0Z cos θ1Z sin δ2 + cos θ21Z
.
(30)
Finally, one can directly use Eq. (7) to estimate the phase error rate eX .
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B. Lo-Preskill’s analysis with imperfectly characterised states
With the method described above, it is possible to employ the leaky source without compromising the security of
the QKD system. Nonetheless, depending on the situation and the particular experimental parameters it might be
beneficial to consider another method that in some cases might provide a higher key generation rate. Therefore, it is
important to compare our generalised loss-tolerant protocol with an alternative method, say the Lo-Preskill’s analysis
introduced in [29]. In Appendix D, we provide a detailed description of this analysis.
To ensure a fair comparison between both protocols we consider the efficient four-state loss-tolerant protocol, where
the four states of the BB84 protocol [39] are used to run two loss-tolerant protocols simultaneously. That is, when Alice
emits the state |ω0X〉B (|ω1X〉B) she considers that it belongs to the first (second) loss-tolerant protocol, while each
of the two protocols is randomly chosen by Alice before sending the pulse. See Eq. (D7) for the definition of the state
|ω1X〉B in the presence of SPFs. This means that no modifications to the hardware of the standard BB84 protocol are
required and therefore, the four-state loss-tolerant protocol is equivalent to the BB84 protocol from an experimental
point of view. Furthermore, we consider the same assumptions about the states for both of them. Namely, we employ
the decomposition of the state of the single-photon pulses emitted by Alice into a single-mode qubit and any other
modes which are orthogonal to the former, i.e., Eq. (1). For the simulations, we apply Lo-Preskill’s analysis to the
same particular device model described in Section IV.A.
In order to quantify the phase error rate eX in the Lo-Preskill’s analysis we use the following expression [29]
eX ≤ eZ + 4∆′(1−∆′)(1− 2eZ) + 4(1− 2∆′)
√
∆′(1−∆′)eZ(1− eZ), (31)
which depends on the bit error rate eZ and on the imbalance ∆
′ of a quantum coin. To find this imbalance, we need
to calculate the inner product of Eqs. (D1) and (D2). In turn, these equations depend on the states |Φjβ〉BE , defined
in Eq. (27), therefore, their overlaps allows us to find ∆′. Using Eq. (27) we can calculate the inner product of these
states to be
〈Φjβ |Φj′β′〉BE = cos θjβ cos θj′β′C2I 〈ωjβ |ωj′β′〉B , (32)
where j, j′ ∈ {0, 1} and β, β′ ∈ {X,Y }.
Using the same definition for the secret key rate given by Eq. (4), below we compare both security approaches for
the same device model as a function of the device parameters.
C. Results and discussion
We show the results obtained for R as a function of the overall system loss (which includes both the channel
attenuation and the loss at Bob’s receiver), for different values of δ, θjβ and µ which correspond to the SPFs, non-
qubit assumption and THA respectively. The angles θjβ are chosen such that they are associated with Alice’s encoding
of the states |ωjβ〉B . That is, θ0Z = 0, θ1Z = piθˆ and θ0X = pi2 θˆ for a certain angle θˆ. In our simulations, we consider the
experimental parameters to be: the dark count rate pd = 10
−7, f = 1.16 and the fiber loss coefficient α = 0.2 dB/Km.
Moreover, we assume for simplicity that in the loss-tolerant protocol and in the Lo-Preskill’s analysis PZA = PZB =
1
2 .
This selection of probabilities might not be ideal but it is sufficient for the purpose of the simulation. By using the
channel model described in Appendix E, we find that YZ = Y
(Z)
0Z,0Z+Y
(Z)
1Z,0Z+Y
(Z)
0Z,1Z+Y
(Z)
1Z,1Z = PZAPZB
[
4(1− η2 )pd+η
]
where η is the overall transmission efficiency of the system. The bit error rate is then given by
eZ =
2
(
1− η2
)
pd +
η
2 +
η
4 (cos 2δ + cos δ)(pd − 1)
4
(
1− η2
)
pd + η
. (33)
1. Generalised loss-tolerant protocol
In order to evaluate how the different imperfections of the source affect the key generation rate we analyse each of
them separately. For the simulations, we select the SPFs according to the experimental results reported in [35, 40, 41].
There are some works related with the mode dependency [35, 42], but unfortunately they do not directly provide
the value of θˆ. Therefore, we evaluate θˆ over a big range and choose the angles θjβ to be: θ0Z = 0, θ1Z = piθˆ and
θ0X =
pi
2 θˆ for a certain angle θˆ. This choice comes from Alice’s encoding of the different states, which means that θjβ
is associated with the prepared state |ωjβ〉B . Obviously, a better experimental characterisation of the source would
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be essential to improve the accuracy of the current parameters. Finally, for the intensity of Eve’s back reflected light
during the THA, we select a range based on the work presented in [21].
Furthermore, we consider both the cases when the mode dependency parameter θjβ , which is associated with the
non-qubit assumption, is independent and dependent on Alice’s bit and basis choice. When it is independent (i.e.,
when θjβ = θ), Eqs. (27) and (28) are simplified and become, respectively
|Φjβ〉BE =
(
cos θ |ωjβ〉HB + sin θ |ωjβ〉V B
)⊗ (CI |v〉E + CD |ejβ〉E )
= cos θ CI |ωjβ〉HB |v〉E +
[
cos θ CD |ωjβ〉HB |ejβ〉E + sin θ |ωjβ〉V B ⊗
(
CI |v〉E + CD |ejβ〉E
)]
,
(34)
and
|ψ〉BE,jX,vir = CI cos θ
√
2− (−1)j 2 sin δ
2
|γjX〉BE +
√
C2I sin
2 θ
(
2− (−1)j 2 sin δ
2
)
+ 2C2D |γ⊥jX〉BE . (35)
Using these equations, and following the method described in Section III, we estimate the phase error rate. When
the mode dependency parameter is setting dependent, we use Eqs. (27) and (28) with θjβ , for jβ ∈ {0Z, 1Z, 0X}.
Fig. 2(a) demonstrates that even if δ increases the key rate stays approximately the same, which means that Eve
cannot enhance the flaws of the signals by exploiting channel loss. This is one main advantage of the loss-tolerant
protocol [17].
We consider the case when θ is independent of Alice’s encoding in Fig. 2(b). The perfect scenario, i.e, when θ = 0,
implies that the signals prepared by Alice are in the single horizontal mode H, as seen in Eq. (34). If θ increases, the
fraction of vertical polarisation also increases and the states sent becomes progressively more imperfect and vulnerable
to a possible attack. For instance, these states form a three dimensional Hilbert space hence, Eve can perform an
unambiguous state discrimination (USD) attack [43, 44], in which she sends the identified state to Bob only when the
USD measurement succeeds. This results in a decrease of the secret key rate as shown in Fig. 2(b). Additionally, our
results show that as long as θ is sufficiently small (for the experimental parameters considered this means θ / 10−7)
the effect on the secret key rate is small, since it is approximately the same as when θ = 0. It is important to note,
however, that because we are assuming a setting independent θ we have the freedom to choose a good polarisation
mode. For instance, instead of the definition used above we could have called cos θ |ωjZ〉HB + sin θ |ωjZ〉V B our mode
if Alice had identified θ exactly, and regard it as the single-mode qubit, in turn affecting the results shown in Fig.
2(b). This means that Eve would be unable to exploit this flaw and obtain information about the key, and hence
the secret key rate would be unaffected. This scenario would be equivalent to θ = 0 and it is not the one considered
in Fig. 2(b). For the setting dependent parameter θjβ , we obtain a slightly lower key rate as expected, since this
scenario provides more information about Alice’s encoding to a possible eavesdropper. The reason for this difference
lies in the orthogonality of the states, which increases when we have a setting dependent θjβ .
Finally, Fig. 2(d) shows how the THA affects the generalised loss-tolerant protocol, where µ quantifies the intensity
of Eve’s back reflected light. An increase in µ results in a lower secret key rate since Eve acquires more information
about Alice’s encoding thus compromising the security of the system. Furthermore, no key can be obtained around
µ ' 10−3. By comparing Figs. 2(b) and 2(d), it can be seen that there is a relationship between µ and θ. In particular,
the resulting secret key rate coincides when µ ∼ θ2. For example, the key rate is the same when µ = 10−6 and when
θ = 10−3. This relationship can also be obtained analytically from the coefficient of the first term in Eq. (34), by
using approximations to the series expansion of cos θ and e−µ.
2. Comparison between the generalised loss-tolerant protocol and the Lo-Preskill’s analysis
In a similar manner, we can evaluate how the secret key generation rate R depends on the device parameters for
the Lo-Preskill’s analysis. The results and discussion are in Appendix D. Below we compare both security proofs and
identify which one provides a better R depending on the experimental set-up. This way an experimentalist can choose
which method to use for known device parameters, and ensure the security of the generated key between Alice and
Bob. Here, we select the SPFs to be either δ = 0.063 or δ = 0.126, and for the mode dependency we choose θˆ = 10−3
and θˆ = 10−5. In this comparison we use the setting dependent mode dependency parameter since it corresponds to
a more realistic scenario. Finally, for the intensity of Eve’s back reflected light during the THA we use µ = 10−10,
µ = 10−7 and µ = 10−4. The results are shown in Fig. 3. Note that, the blue and red dashed lines coincide (for the
resolution presented) in all graphs. The reason lies in the value of the variable µ. That is, for µ = 10−10 and µ = 10−7,
the Lo-Preskill’s analysis results in approximately the same secret key rate (see Appendix D for more details).
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FIG. 2: Asymptotic secret key rate R versus the overall system loss measured in dB for the generalised loss-tolerant
protocol for various values of δ, θjβ and µ. When we change the value of one of these parameters the others are
kept constant and set to zero, which allows us to observe how each parameter affects the secret key rate. (a) Even
if the parameter δ that characterises the SPFs increases, R stays almost the same. (b) Setting independent θ: As θ
gets larger, the further away we are from the qubit scenario, hence R decreases. (c) Setting dependent θjβ : The key
generation rate decreases even further due to passive information leakage, in particular, θˆ ' 10−2 no longer provides
a positive key generation rate. (d) As the intensity µ increases Eve obtains more information about the key causing
the key rate to decrease.
By comparing Figs. 3(a) and 3(c), or Figs. 3(b) and 3(d), we can see how an increase in the parameter δ, which
is associated with SPFs, affects both protocols. For the generalised loss-tolerant protocol (LT) the key rate stays
approximately the same as expected, since this method is loss tolerant to SPFs. On the other hand, the Lo-Preskill’s
analysis (LP) is more influenced by SPFs (see also Fig. 7 in Appendix D). The reason for this difference is that in
LP it is assumed the worst case scenario, in which Eve can enhance the basis dependence of the signals by exploiting
the channel loss. However, in LT no such assumption is required hence the performance is maintained. This means
that LT will typically outperform LP in the presence of high SPFs.
To compare LT and LP as a function of the setting dependent θjβ we can contrast Figs. 3(a) and 3(b), or
Figs. 3(c) and 3(d). The graphs show clear differences due to decreasing the value of θˆ, especially for the LT
case. In Fig. 3(a) LP reaches a longer distance for any value of µ, but when θˆ = 10−5 LT gets better, particularly
for µ = 10−10 as seen in Fig. 3(b). Furthermore, Fig. 3(b) shows that even when there are SPFs, LP can still do better
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FIG. 3: Secret key rate R versus the overall system loss measured in dB for the generalised loss-tolerant protocol (LT)
and Lo-Preskill (LP) analysis. The blue and red lines are superimposed in all graphs. (a) The Lo-Preskill’s protocol
performs better in this scenario because the SPFs are small but θˆ is high. (b) For a smaller θˆ, the loss-tolerant analysis
is better when µ = 10−10. (c) The generalised loss-tolerant protocol performs better when θˆ is larger even if δ is high.
(d) For large δ and small θˆ, the generalised loss-tolerant clearly surpasses the Lo-Preskill’s analysis when µ = 10−10
or µ = 10−7.
than LT if the states sent are far from the idealised qubit. This is because the non-qubit assumption negatively affects
more LT than LP (see Figs. 2(c) and 7(c)).
When we compare the values of µ for the LT and LP we can see a similar trend in the secret key rate for all graphs
in Fig. 3. Namely, the difference between the curves when µ = 10−10 (blue) and µ = 10−4 (yellow) is much larger
for LT than for LP, which means that the THA is worse for the LT. However, µ is a parameter that might be easily
controlled experimentally by introducing passive countermeasures, such as optical isolators [21]. Indeed, in [21] it has
been shown, for instance, that a value of µ = 10−6 could be easily achieved in practice. For example, even if Eve
sends Alice optical pulses with 1020 photons, practical combinations of the components of Alice’s transmitter could
guarantee a total optical isolation of -170 dB, which would be enough to achieve µ = 10−6 [21]. This means that the
LT method may be a better alternative when the SPFs are more dominant and mode dependency is small, since it
outperforms the LP analysis in Figs. 3(b) and 3(d).
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As explained above, the non-qubit assumption and the THA affect more the LT than the LP analysis. This might
be because our generalisation of the loss-tolerant protocol is overestimating Eve. When we calculate the bounds for
the yields we obtain that the eigenvalues λmax and λmin depend on the state preparation. However, this is probably
too pessimistic because there might be some additional constraints among them, since the space spanned by the
states associated to 0Z and 1Z, respectively, is not orthogonal to the one spanned by the virtual states associated
to 0Xvir and 1Xvir. This means that these separate optimisations should not be possible in practise because Eve
cannot achieve optimal values for all λs. In other words, by improving our characterisation of the states we can
improve the performance of the generalised loss-tolerant protocol. This is however beyond the scope of this paper
and we leave it for future work.
In order to further investigate the differences between the two methods, we determine the parameter regimes where
their performance is identical. First, by setting θˆ = 10−6, we can identify which values of δ and µ provide the same
key generation rate R for LT and LP. The results are presented in Fig. 4(a), where the diagram clearly shows which
protocol performs better given a certain δ and µ: above the fitted curve, the LT provides a better performance but
below the curve LP is the preferable method. In other words, as the SPFs increase the LT is superior but, as µ
increases LP becomes more suitable.
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FIG. 4: The fitted line corresponds to those experimental parameters that result in the same key generation rate R
for both methods, the generalised loss-tolerant protocol and the Lo-Preskill’s analysis. Above the line, the generalised
loss-tolerant protocol performs better and below the line, the Lo-Preskill’s analysis is the preferred method. The data
points were fitted using a shape-preserving interpolant in Matlab. (a) Plot of δ against µ for θˆ = 10−6. (b) Plot of δ
against θˆ for µ = 10−6.
Similar results are obtained when µ = 10−6. This case is particularly useful since in principle we can control the
value of µ experimentally by the amount of isolation we use in our devices. Again, as SPFs increase the LT becomes
better, giving a better estimation of the phase error rate and a better secret key generation rate.
V. CONCLUSION
Typical security proofs ignore many imperfections of experimental devices thus hindering the security claim of
quantum key distribution (QKD). In this work, we have generalised the loss-tolerant QKD protocol to accommodate
general imperfections. In particular, our formalism is valid for a general device model with, for instance, state prepara-
tion flaws (SPFs), mode dependency and Trojan horse attacks (THAs), which result in passive and active information
leakage to an eavesdropper. Using this multi-mode scenario, we have shown that the qubit assumption can be removed
from the loss-tolerant protocol without compromising the security of the QKD scheme. We present a formalism
that can be used to estimate the phase error rate by finding the transmission rates of some virtual states and as-
suming the general state structure defined in Eq. (1). Therefore, in principle it can be applied to most QKD protocols.
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In order to compare our generalised loss-tolerant protocol with other security proofs we have applied the Lo-Preskill’s
analysis [29] to the same device model. In so doing, we have identified which approach delivers a higher secret key
rate as a function of the experimental parameters. For example, the results obtained show that Lo-Preskill’s method
performs better under the non-qubit assumption and the THA but the generalised loss-tolerant protocol is better
when there are SPFs. Since the THAs can be controlled using passive countermeasures, such as optical isolators, we
have shown that in some cases the generalised loss-tolerant protocol might be the preferable method when the SPFs
are more dominant. This way, our work can be used as a guideline to improve current experimental implementations
in which multi-mode QKD is unavoidable. Moreover, it highlights the importance of source characterisation for more
realistic security proofs.
For completeness, we also note that Ref. [45] has recently proposed a computational toolbox that can be used to
numerically estimate the phase error rate of a QKD protocol, and such technique could be applied to the scenario
considered in this paper. Essentially like the Lo-Preskill’s analysis, their technique only requires the knowledge of
the inner products between the states emitted by Alice and is mathematically simple, which is a striking difference
to previous numerical analyses [46, 47]. That is, the approach in [45] can also remove the qubit assumption and
include side-channels when estimating the phase error rate. There are, however, some relevant differences between
that method and our formalism, besides the obvious one, i.e., that our work is an analytical technique. The approach
in [45] requires a full characterisation of the side-channels in order to obtain the inner product of the states, while ours
does not, resulting in a simpler characterisation of the source. Moreover, in the absence of side-channels, their method
is not loss-tolerant in some parameter regimes, while ours is always loss-tolerant, which is essential to guarantee a good
performance over long distances. Furthermore, their analysis considers pure states while our method also applies to
the mixed-state scenario. Despite these differences, it would be interesting to combine the advantages of both methods
to achieve a better implementation security, but we leave this for future works.
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Appendix A: Three-state MDI-QKD
Here, we describe how our generalised loss-tolerant protocol can be applied to MDI-QKD [6]. We assume that Alice
and Bob prepare three-states in the form of Eq. (1), thus including active and passive information leakage. These
states are then sent to an untrusted relay Eve which is located between Alice and Bob. Note that, we name the relay
Eve (instead of using the typical name of Charles) to simplify the notation, since in this way we can use the subscript
E to denote all systems possessed by the eavesdropper. Eve is supposed to perform a Bell state measurement (BSM)
and announce the results over a public channel. Alice and Bob keep the data associated with the successful events and
discard the rest. Finally, to guarantee correctly correlated bit strings, either Alice or Bob apply a bit flip to part of
their data. In this protocol, the Z basis is used to generate the secret key and the X basis for parameter estimation.
As before, we can consider a virtual protocol in which Alice (Bob) prepares the state |ΨZ〉ACE (|ΨZ〉BC′E) in the
Z basis, analogously to Eq. (5), where C (C ′) is the system sent by Alice (Bob) to Eve. For simplicity, the discussion
below considers the case where Eve’s BSM only projects the incoming pulses into one Bell state: |φ+〉. In this case,
the phase error rate is expressed as
eX =
Y
(ZZ)vir
0X,1X,φ+ + Y
(ZZ)vir
1X,0X,φ+
Y
(ZZ)vir
0X,0X,φ+ + Y
(ZZ)vir
1X,0X,φ+ + Y
(ZZ)vir
0X,1X,φ+ + Y
(ZZ)vir
1X,1X,φ+
, (A1)
where Y
(ZZ)vir
sX,jX,φ+ with s, j ∈ {0, 1}, is the joint probability that Alice (Bob) prepares the state |ΨZ〉ACE (|ΨZ〉BC′E)
and Eve declares the outcome |φ+〉, both Alice and Bob select the Z basis but use the X basis for their measurements
of systems A and B, and Alice (Bob) obtains the bit value j (s). In order to find these virtual yields we need to
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calculate
Y
(ZZ)vir
sX,jX,φ+ = PZAPZB Tr
[
Dˆφ+ θˆCE,jX,vir ⊗ θˆC′E,sX,vir
]
, (A2)
where Dˆφ+ corresponds to the announcement of Eve’s outcome |φ+〉, and θˆCE,jX,vir and θˆC′E,sX,vir are defined
similarly to those given by Eq. (8). Following a similar procedure to the one presented Section III, we can find the
transmission rates to be qφ+|ii′ = 14 Tr
[
Dˆφ+ σˆi ⊗ σˆi′
]
with i, i′ ∈ {Id, x, y, z}. As in Eq. (18), we can calculate bounds
of the virtual yields in terms of these quantities and their respective Bloch vector coefficients P jX,viri .
Using the actual events Y
(ZZ)
sZ,jZ,φ+ , Y
(XZ)
0X,jZ,φ+ , Y
(ZX)
sZ,0X,φ+ and Y
(XX)
0X,0X,φ+ we can construct a system of nine linear
inequalities. Finally, by employing the same assumption as before, i.e., the three-states form a triangle in the Bloch
sphere [17], we can guarantee that these equations are linearly independent. Therefore, one can find bounds on the
transmission rates, and consequently estimate the phase error rate.
Appendix B: Security proof against coherent attacks
In this section, we present the security proof of our formalism against coherent attacks. For simplicity of the
discussion, the main text deals with the case of pure states in a single-mode qubit space, however in this Appendix
we consider the general scenario where the states could be mixed states in a single-mode qubit space. For this, we
consider a virtual protocol [48, 49]. This protocol is equivalent to the actual protocol in the sense that the resulting
statistics of the measurements and the secret key rate generated between Alice and Bob are the same. Furthermore,
the classical and quantum information available to Eve is equal in both protocols. The security claim follows from
the fact that Alice and Bob can choose which protocol to execute and Eve is unable to distinguish between them.
Hence, by proving the security of the virtual protocol we prove the security of the actual protocol.
In this work we employ the complementary scenario [33, 34], which considers a virtual protocol that uses the
complementary observable of the key generation basis. For instance, in the actual protocol Alice and Bob agree on
the bit values in the Z basis, while in the virtual protocol, they collaborate to prepare a qubit in an eigenstate of the
X basis. In doing so, the security proof basically reduces to the estimation of the phase error rate, which corresponds
to the bit error rate that Alice and Bob would have observed if they would have measured the Z basis state in the X
basis. Therefore, the aim of the virtual protocol is to estimate the phase error rate. In Section III, we showed how
this can be done by using our formalism and how we can calculate the secret key rate R against collective attacks.
Here, we describe in detail the virtual protocol used for the security proof and explain how to accommodate coherent
attacks by Eve through the use of Azuma’s inequality [32].
1. Virtual protocol
Here, we consider a more general case than that studied in the main text in which Alice generates a single-mode
qubit system B, whose states are mixed states, and we show how to define the pure states needed for our security
proof. We denote the mixed states by the density matrices ρˆ0ZB , ρˆ1ZB and ρˆ0XB . These states are diagonalised as
ρˆjZB = P
0
jZ
∣∣φ0jZ〉〈φ0jZ∣∣B + P 1jZ ∣∣φ1jZ〉〈φ1jZ∣∣B ,
ρˆ0XB = P
0
0X
∣∣φ00X〉〈φ00X ∣∣B + P 1jZ ∣∣φ10X〉〈φ10X ∣∣B , (B1)
where j ∈ {0, 1}, and P 0jZ , P 1jZ , P 00X and P 10X are probabilities satisfying P 0jZ + P 1jZ = 1 and P 00X + P 10X = 1.
Moreover, {|φ0jZ〉B , |φ1jZ〉B} and {|φ00X〉B , |φ10X〉B} are orthonormal bases in the single-mode qubit. The states sent
might be mixed due to imperfections in Alice’s devices, including a potential entanglement between her devices and
Eve’s ancilla. This means that in general these mixed states can be purified by introducing Alice’s ancilla system A1
and Eve’s system E, and therefore we have the purifications of ρˆ0ZB , ρˆ1ZB and ρˆ0XB as |ψ˜0Z〉A1BE , |ψ˜1Z〉A1BE , and
|ψ˜0X〉A1BE , each of which expressed by
|ψ˜jZ〉A1BE =
√
P 0jZ |0jZ〉A1E |φ0jZ〉B +
√
P 1jZ |1jZ〉A1E |φ1jZ〉B ,
|ψ˜0X〉A1BE =
√
P 00X |00X〉A1E |φ00X〉B +
√
P 10X |10X〉A1E |φ10X〉B .
(B2)
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Here, {|0jZ〉A1E , |1jZ〉A1E} and {|00X〉A1E , |10X〉A1E} are orthonormal bases. Now, we define states similar to Eq.
(5) that include the purification of Alice’s state:
|Ψ˜Z〉A1A2BE =
1√
2
[
|0Z〉A2 |ψ˜0Z〉A1BE + |1Z〉A2 |ψ˜1Z〉A1BE
]
,
|Ψ˜X〉A1A2BE = |0X〉A2 |ψ˜0X〉A1BE ,
(B3)
where A2 is Alice’s ancilla system used to generate a bit value in the protocol, i.e., it possesses information about
Alice’s encoding. As explained above, in the security analysis Alice measures A2 in the X basis instead of the Z basis
when |Ψ˜Z〉A1A2BE is prepared, therefore, it is useful to write this state in the X basis of system A2. By substituting
|0Z〉A2 = 1√2 (|0X〉A2 + |1X〉A2) and |1Z〉A2 = 1√2 (|0X〉A2 − |1X〉A2) we can express |Ψ˜Z〉A1A2BE as
|Ψ˜Z〉A1A2BE =
√
1 + 〈ψ˜0Z |ψ˜1Z〉A1BE
2
|0X〉A2 |ψ˜vir0X 〉A1BE +
√
1− 〈ψ˜0Z |ψ˜1Z〉A1BE
2
|1X〉A2 |ψ˜vir1X 〉A1BE , (B4)
where
|ψ˜virjX 〉A1BE =
|ψ˜0Z〉A1BE + (−1)j |ψ˜1Z〉A1BE√
2
(
1 + (−1)j 〈ψ˜0Z |ψ˜1Z〉A1BE
) . (B5)
In the virtual protocol, we consider that Alice sends Bob two virtual states, |ψ˜virjX 〉A1BE , and three actual states,
|ψ˜jZ〉A1BE and |ψ˜0X〉A1BE , which are used to estimate the phase error rate. We have seen that even in the case of
mixed states we can define actual and virtual pure states, and these pure states can be directly used in our security
proof. Therefore, our formalism is valid for mixed states in a single-mode qubit space.
Next, let us continue to explain the security proof in more detail. The selection of these actual and virtual states
can be expressed as
|ϕ〉SA1BE =
5∑
c=1
√
P (c) |c〉S |ϑ(c)〉A1BE , (B6)
where S is the shield system that is kept inside of Alice’s lab and the states |ϑ(c)〉A1BE are
|ϑ(1)〉A1BE = |ψ˜vir0X 〉A1BE ,
|ϑ(2)〉A1BE = |ψ˜vir1X 〉A1BE ,
|ϑ(3)〉A1BE = |ψ˜0Z〉A1BE ,
|ϑ(4)〉A1BE = |ψ˜1Z〉A1BE ,
|ϑ(5)〉A1BE = |ψ˜0X〉A1BE ,
(B7)
with their respective probabilities P (c)
P (1) =
PZAPZB
2
(
1 + 〈ψ˜0Z |ψ˜1Z〉A1BE
)
,
P (2) =
PZAPZB
2
(
1− 〈ψ˜0Z |ψ˜1Z〉A1BE
)
,
P (3) =
PZAPXB
2
,
P (4) =
PZAPXB
2
,
P (5) = PXAPZB + PXAPXB = PXA .
(B8)
When Bob receives the states he performs a measurement in either the Z or the X basis, and these are defined by
the POVMs described in Section II. Also, all announcements between Alice and Bob are done via an authenticated
public channel. Note that, in the virtual protocol we assume that Alice and Bob are sitting in the same lab so that
they can choose the measurement basis, and this is allowed because the quantum and classical information available
to Eve is the same between the actual and the virtual protocols. The detailed steps of the virtual protocol are
presented below and the logic schematics in Fig. 5.
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1. Initialisation: Before running the protocol, Alice and Bob agree on a number Nfixed of rounds, on the error
correcting codes, and on a set of hash functions to perform privacy amplification. Steps 2-4 of the protocol are
repeated N times until the number of detected events N becomes Nfixed.
2. State Preparation: After a potential THA, Alice prepares systems S, A1 and BE in the entangled state
|ϕ〉SA1BE , in Eq. (B6), and sends Bob the system BE via a quantum channel.
3. QND measurement: For each incoming system, Bob performs a quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement
to determine whether the signals are detected or not. If Bob obtains a detection event he keeps the resulting
system and N is increased by 1 unit.
4. Detection announcement: If N = Nfixed, Bob announces the termination of quantum communication and
the detection pattern. Otherwise Alice and Bob return to Step 2 of the protocol.
5. Measurement and basis announcement: For each of the detected events, Alice measures her system S and
announces the Z (X) basis when c = 1, 2, 3, 4 (c = 5). Bob announces the Z (X) basis for c = 1, 2 (3, 4), but he
always measures in the X basis. For c = 5, Bob selects the basis β ∈ {Z,X} probabilistically and announces
his basis choice. Then, he carries out the measurement on system BE in his selected basis.
6. Sifting and announcement: Alice and Bob define and announce the bit strings ~sX,0Z , ~sX,1Z and ~sX,0X ,
which correspond to the events when Alice sends the actual states and Bob performs the X basis measurements.
These are the basis mismatched events when c = 3, 4 and one of the events when c = 5, the basis matched event.
These strings are used to estimate the phase error rate.
QND
click
no	click
Discarded	
Alice	
measures	
system	S
c	=	1
c	=	3
c	=	2
c	=	4
c	=	5
PXB
PZB
XA		, XB	
XA		, XB	
ZA		, XB	
ZA		, XB	
XA		, XB	
XA		, ZB	
0X		, 0X	
0X		, 1X	
0Z , 0X	
0Z , 1X	
1Z , 0X	
1Z , 1X	
0X , 0X	
0X , 1X	
0X		, 0Z
0X		, 1Z
1X		, 0X	
1X		, 1X	
FIG. 5: The logical schematics for the virtual protocol, where the notation XA/ZA, XB/ZB corresponds to Alice’s
and Bob’s measurements bases respectively. The virtual states correspond to c = 1, 2, the actual Z states to c = 3, 4,
and the actual X states to c = 5. For each click event, Alice measures system S and Bob measures system BE.
Note that, the selection of c = 1, 2, 3, 4 already includes Bob’s measurement in the X basis, but when c = 5 his
measurement basis is chosen probabilistically.
In the virtual protocol, we require that Alice and Bob postpone their measurements until the quantum communi-
cation ends, therefore, we assume that Alice and Bob possess quantum memories where they can store their systems.
The reason for this deferral comes from the application of Azuma’s inequality, which is explained later. In the case
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of Alice, she only makes her measurement after the termination condition, in Step 5. This is allowed because it does
not matter when she performs the measurement since it commutes with Eve’s operations and hence it will not affect
Alice’s statistics. For Bob, we divide his measurement in two steps: a QND measurement, which allows him to know
when a detected event occurred, and a measurement to output the bit value with the chosen basis. If the QND
measurement results in a detected instance, Bob performs the measurement using the Z or X basis. We are able to
delay Bob’s measurement choice because the inconclusive outcomes are assumed to be independent of the basis, as
explained in Section II. The key point in the virtual protocol is as follows: the security of the events when Alice sends
the actual Z basis states and Bob obtains a detected event in the actual protocol with the Z basis, can be analysed
by imagining that Alice and Bob both employ the X basis to measure respectively the systems A2 and BE. This
means that when Alice sends a virtual state (c = 1, 2) Bob’s measurement basis is always the X basis.
It is clear that the virtual protocol described here is equivalent to the actual protocol in Section II. This is so
because the quantum states sent by Alice are the same in both protocols as well as the announcements made by the
two parties. For instance, when Alice sends the virtual states they both measure in the X basis but they announce
the Z basis (Step 5). In the actual protocol, these events are used for key generation and therefore Alice and Bob
also announce the Z basis. This means that the protocols are indistinguishable from Eve’s perspective as required.
Note that, the virtual protocol does not produce a key, it is merely used for the estimation of the phase error rate.
2. Azuma’s inequality and its application to the security proof
In coherent attacks, Eve interacts with all the signals sent by Alice followed by a joint measurement after listening
to all the classical information exchanged between Alice and Bob. In this scenario we use Azuma’s inequality [32]
which takes into account this dependency, and allows us to derive a relation between the expected values and the
observed values. Most importantly, once we have the conditional probabilities on all previous measurement outcomes
we can to find the actual number of events observed.
Azumas’s inequality can be applied to a stochastic model as long as a sequence of random variables is a mar-
tingale and satisfies the bounded difference conditions (BDC). A Martingale is a sequence of random variables
X(0), X(1), ..., X(l) for which the expectation E[·] of the next value is equal to the present value in the sequence
given that we know all the previous outcomes, i.e., E[X(l+1)|X(0), X(1), ..., X(l)] = X(l) for all l ≥ 0. This sequence
is said to satisfy BDC if there exists c(l) > 0 such that |X(l+1) −X(l)| ≤ c(l) for all l ≥ 0. For N trials of a variable
X(l) with c(l) = 1, Azuma’s inequality states that
P
[|X(N) −X(0)| > NδA] ≤ 2e−Nδ2A2 , (B9)
holds for any δA ∈ (0, 1). Now, for the lth trial, we define X(l) as
X(l) := Λ(l) −
l∑
k=1
P (ζk = 1|ζ0, ..., ζk−1), (B10)
where Λ(l) is a random variable representing the actual number of events (that is Λ(l) =
∑l
k=1 ζk ) observed during
the first l trials, ζk is the random variable of interest and it has the value of 0 or 1. Moreover, P (ζk = 1|ζ0, ..., ζk−1)
is the conditional probability of obtaining the outcome specified by ζk = 1 in the kth trial given that the first k − 1
outcomes are ζ0, ..., ζk−1. It is possible to show that the sequence of random variables in Eq. (B10) is Martingale and
satisfies the BDC. Hence, we can apply the Azuma’s inequality and write
P
[∣∣∣∣Λ(N) − N∑
k=1
P (ζk = 1|ζ0, ..., ζk−1)
∣∣∣∣ > NδA
]
≤ 2e
−Nδ2A
2 , (B11)
where we use the definition X(0) = 0. This also means that
N∑
k=1
P (ζk = 1|ζ0, ..., ζk−1)−NδA ≤ Λ(N) ≤
N∑
k=1
P (ζk = 1|ζ0, ..., ζk−1) +NδA, (B12)
holds at least with probability P = 1− 2e−Nδ
2
A
2 . Therefore,
Λ(N) =
N∑
k=1
P (ζk = 1|ζ0, ..., ζk−1) + δB , (B13)
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except for error probability  + ˆ, where the deviation parameter δB ∈ [−∆, ∆ˆ]. These bounds are defined as
∆ = f(N, ) and ∆ˆ = f(N, ˆ) where f(x, y) =
√
2x ln(1/y).
Let us now show how we use this inequality in our security proof. In particular, we consider
X
(l)
csX = Λ
(l)
csX −
l∑
k=1
P (ζk,csX = 1|ζ0, ..., ζk−1), (B14)
where csX = c, s for c = 1, 2, 3, 4 since Bob’s basis choice is already included in these cases, and csX = c, s,X for
c = 5. In Eq. (B14), P (ζk,csX = 1|ζ0, ..., ζk−1) is the probability of Alice selecting the state c and Bob observing s
(s,X) for s ∈ {0, 1} when c = 1, 2, 3, 4 (c = 5) in the kth trial, conditional on all the previous outcomes from the
measurements ζ0, ..., ζk−1. To obtain this probability we first define
|τ〉SA1BE = |ϕk−1〉SA1BE |ϕk〉SA1BE |ϕr〉SA1BE , (B15)
to be the state prepared by Alice in an execution of the protocol, where |ϕk−1〉SA1BE , |ϕk〉SA1BE and |ϕr〉SA1BE
correspond to all the systems before the kth trial, in the kth trial and in the rest of the trials after k (i.e., r = N −k),
respectively.
Eve’s action can be described as UˆBEE′ |τ〉SA1BE |0〉E′ =
∑
t BˆtB |τ〉SA1BE |t〉E′ , where UˆBEE′ is a unitary transfor-
mation acting on systems BEE′, BˆtB is the Kraus operator which acts on system BE depending on Eve’s measurement
outcome t, and |t〉{t=1,2,...} is an orthonormal basis. Note that, here we use the subscript E to refer to Eve’s system
originating from a THA and E′ corresponds to the additional ancilla system in her hands. Alice and Bob only
communicate after performing the measurements so these parameters are independent of the state preparation.
In order to consider Alice’s and Bob’s measurements previous to the kth trial, we define the operator Oˆk−1,SBE =
⊗k−1ν=1MˆSνBEν , where MˆSνBEν denotes the Kraus operator associated with the νth measurement outcome of Alice and
Bob. Hence, after Eve’s interaction, the normalised kth state of the system SBE conditioned on the measurement
outcomes, Ok−1, and the detected event can be expressed as
ρˆSBEk|Ok−1 =
σˆSBEk|Ok−1
Tr
(
σˆSBEk|Ok−1
) , (B16)
where the state σˆSBEk|Ok−1 is defined shortly below (see Eq. (B18)). We know that
σˆSA1BEk|Ok−1 =
∑
t
Trk¯
[
FˆBEkOˆk−1,SBEBˆtB |τ〉SA1BE 〈τ | Bˆ
†
tBOˆ†k−1,SBEFˆ †BEk
]
, (B17)
where Trk¯ is the partial trace over the systems S, A1 and BE for all the events that are not in the kth trial, and
FˆBEk is Bob’s Kraus operator acting on the kth system, corresponding to the detected events. This means taking the
trace with the basis {|~xk−1〉 , |~xr〉}, where |~xk−1〉 corresponds to all the systems in the first k− 1 runs and |~xr〉 to the
rest of the systems after k. Then, we can rewrite Eq. (B17) as
σˆSBEk|Ok−1 =
∑
t
∑
~xk−1,~xr
TrkA1
[
A
(~xk−1,~xr)
t,BE|Ok−1 |ϕk〉SA1BE 〈ϕk|A
†(~xk−1,~xr)
t,BE|Ok−1
]
, (B18)
where TrkA1 is the partial trace over the system A1 in the kth trial and A
(~xk−1,~xr)
t,BE|Ok−1 is the Kraus operator acting on
the kth system conditional on all the previous detected events, and it is defined as
A
(~xk−1,~xr)
t,BE|Ok−1 = 〈~xr| 〈~xk−1| FˆBEkOˆk−1,SBE BˆtB |ϕk−1〉SA1BE |ϕr〉SA1BE . (B19)
By substituting Eq.(B6) into Eq.(B18) we get
σˆSBEk|Ok−1 =
∑
c,c′
√
P (c)P (c′)
∑
t
∑
~xk−1,~xr
TrkA1
[
A
(~xk−1,~xr)
t,BE|Ok−1 |c〉S 〈c′| ⊗ |ϑ(c)〉A1BE 〈ϑ(c
′)|A†(~xk−1,~xr)t,BE|Ok−1
]
. (B20)
It is clear now that this state is dependent on Eve’s action as well as on the previous outcomes. Also, note that the
partial trace only acts on system A1. The probability that Alice obtains the outcome c, Bob selects the X basis and
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obtains a bit value s conditional on all the previous measurement outcomes is calculated as
PcsX|Ok−1 =
P (X ∩ c)
Tr
(
σˆSBEk|Ok−1
)∑
t
∑
~xk−1,~xr
Tr
[
A
(~xk−1,~xr)
t,BE|Ok−1 Tr
k
A1
[
|ϑ(c)〉〈ϑ(c)|A1BE
]
A
†(~xk−1,~xr)
t,BE|Ok−1MˆsX
]
=
P (X ∩ c)
Tr
(
σˆSBEk|Ok−1
) Tr[DˆsX|Ok−1 TrkA1 [ |ϑ(c)〉〈ϑ(c)|A1BE ]
] (B21)
where P (X ∩ c) = P (c) for c = 1, 2, 3, 4 and P (X ∩ c) = P (c)P (XB) for c = 5. In this expression, DˆsX|Ok−1 =∑
t
∑
~xk−1,~xr A
†(~xk−1,~xr)
t,BE|Ok−1MˆsXA
(~xk−1,~xr)
t,BE|Ok−1 represents Eve’s action as well as Bob’s measurement. This is independent
of c, which means that Eve cannot behave differently depending of the state sent. Importantly, the probability
PcsX|Ok−1 essentially corresponds to the actual yields YsX,jβ in the main text when c = 3, 4, 5. Note that the yields
in this Appendix are normalised by the detected events while those in the main text are not. In the finite key size
regime, the normalisation according to the detected events results in a better performance, however, in the limit of
large number of pulses, they are essentially the same. As we consider this limit throughout this paper, in the main
text we adopt the yields that are not normalised by the detected events for simplicity of explanation. We know Λ3sX ,
Λ4sX and Λ5sX by collecting the corresponding number of events from the actual protocol. Therefore using Azuma’s
inequality, i.e., Eq. (B13), we can calculate the conditional probabilities which correspond to the yields Y
(Z)
sX,0Z , Y
(Z)
sX,1Z
and Y
(X)
sX,0X respectively. From Section III, we know how these yields are related to the transmission rates, and in
turn, how these are related to the virtual yields Y
(Z)vir
1X,0Z and Y
(Z)vir
0X,1Z . Here, we would like to emphasise that using Eq.
(18) we can calculate these yields, which correspond to the probabilities P11X|Ok−1 and P20X|Ok−1 respectively, both
of which are conditional on the previous measurement outcomes. Using Azuma’s inequality again, we can find the
number of number of events, Λ11X and Λ20X , which are the number of phase errors, and this concludes the estimation
of the phase error rate.
Appendix C: Coefficients
In this appendix, we list the coefficients used in the main text. Direct calculations show that the coefficients Aj ,
Bj and Cj for Eqs. (14)-(18) are given by
Aj =
1
4
[
|a0Z |2 + (−1)j
(
a∗0Za1Z〈φ0Z |φ1Z〉BE + a0Za∗1Z〈φ1Z |φ0Z〉BE
)
+ |a1Z |2
]
,
Bj =
1
4
√
|a0Z |2 + (−1)j
(
a∗0Za1Z〈φ0Z |φ1Z〉BE + a0Za∗1Z〈φ1Z |φ0Z〉BE
)
+ |a1Z |2
×
√
|b0Z |2 + (−1)j
(
b∗0Zb1Z〈φ⊥0Z |φ⊥1Z〉BE + b0Zb21Z〈φ⊥1Z |φ⊥0Z〉BE
)
+ |b1Z |2,
Cj =
1
4
[
|b0Z |2 + (−1)j
(
b∗0Zb1Z〈φ⊥0Z |φ⊥1Z〉BE + b0Zb∗1Z〈φ⊥1Z |φ⊥0Z〉BE
)
+ b21Z
]
.
(C1)
Appendix D: Lo-Preskill’s analysis
In this section, we outline the security argument of Lo-Preskill’s analysis [29] and apply it to the particular device
model described in the main text.
1. Description of Lo-Preskill’s protocol
In order to prove the security of the BB84 protocol [39], where the state of the emitted pulses is not phase
randomised, we convert the actual protocol into an entanglement based protocol. In this protocol, the Z basis states
are prepared when Alice measures her system A of the entangled state
|ΥZ〉ABE =
1√
2
[ |0Z〉A ⊗ |Φ0Z〉BE + |1Z〉A ⊗ |Φ1Z〉BE ], (D1)
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with the basis {|0Z〉 , |1Z〉}. Similarly, she prepares the X basis states by measuring her system A of the following
entangled state in the basis {|0X〉 , |1X〉}
|ΥX〉ABE =
1√
2
[ |0X〉A ⊗ |Φ0X〉BE + |1X〉A ⊗ |Φ1X〉BE ]. (D2)
These states contain Eve’s system E since we are considering a potential THA, and the states |Φjβ〉 for j ∈ {0, 1}
and β ∈ {Z,X} are defined in Eq. (1). If the state preparation is perfect and the source is completely isolated there
is no passive or active leakage of information, which is the case when δ = θjβ = µ = 0. This means that these states
are basis independent, i.e., |ΥZ〉ABE = |ΥX〉ABE . When the state preparation is not perfect (at least one of the
quantities δ, θjβ , µ is greater than zero), the states |ΥZ〉ABE and |ΥX〉ABE are close to each other but not equal
hence, some information related with the basis choice could be leaked from the source. This means that Eve might
be able to distinguish the states emitted when the Z basis is chosen from the ones when the X basis is chosen. This
basis-dependency can be quantified by considering an equivalent virtual protocol that evaluates the “balance” of a
“quantum coin” [16]. To investigate this, we consider that Alice prepares the state
|Γ〉CABE =
1√
2
[ |0Z〉C ⊗ |ΥZ〉ABE + |1Z〉C ⊗ |ΥX〉ABE ], (D3)
where C corresponds to the quantum coin. She performs a measurement on the coin with the basis {|0Z〉 , |1Z〉}
to determine the encoding of the signal. From Koashi’s approach [34, 50], we can find the phase errors using the
complementary scenario, by applying the “Bloch sphere bound” [51] to the quantum coin. For this, we consider
switching the measurement basis (to measure with the X basis instead of the Z basis) on the quantum coin, thus it
is useful to write Eq.(D3) as
|Γ〉CABE =
1
2
[ |0X〉C ( |ΥZ〉ABE + |ΥX〉ABE )+ |1X〉C ( |ΥZ〉ABE − |ΥX〉ABE )]. (D4)
For characterising how close these states are, we employ the probability ∆ associated with finding the state |1X〉C
and the outcome X = 1. This can be expressed as
∆ =
1
4
(
2− 〈ΥZ |ΥX〉ABE − 〈ΥZ |ΥX〉∗ABE
)
, (D5)
where 〈ΥZ |ΥX〉∗ABE is the complex conjugate of 〈ΥZ |ΥX〉ABE . These overlaps can be calculated to obtain ∆, which
quantifies the basis dependence of Alice’s states. If there are no imperfections, the inner product 〈ΥZ |ΥX〉ABE =〈ΥZ |ΥX〉∗ABE = 1 and therefore the coin imbalance is ∆ = 0. Note that, this justifies our choices of states in Eqs.
(D1) and (D2). Similarly, when they are completely orthogonal to each other the inner products are zero and ∆ = 12 .
This means that, the closer these states are to each other, the smaller is the coin imbalance ∆ and therefore, less
information is leaked to Eve.
In a QKD scheme, not all the signals sent from the source are detected due to channel loss. Therefore, Eve might
take advantage of this flaw by blocking certain signals that are not favourable to her without being detected, enhancing
the basis dependence of the signals. To take this into consideration, the Lo-Preskill’s analysis assumes the worst case
scenario, where it maximises the imbalance of the coin, or in other words, maximises the leakage of information to
Eve. This means that it assumes that all the signals that do not produce a click on Bob’s side are associated with
the outcome X = 0 when measuring the quantum coin. The accommodation of this worst case scenario is reflected
by considering an enhancement probability of ∆ such that: ∆′ = ∆min[YZ ,YX ] where YZ (YX) is the single photon yield
in the Z (X) basis [21].
In order to find the secret key rate R we need to estimate the phase error rate eX , which corresponds to what the
bit error rate would have been if Alice and Bob had measured their states in the X basis when the entangled state
prepared is |ΥZ〉ABE . In the Lo-Preskill’s analysis, eX cannot be calculated directly from the channel model but
using eZ and the coin imbalance ∆
′ the phase error rate can be estimated to be [29]
eX ≤ eZ + 4∆′(1−∆′)(1− 2eZ) + 4(1− 2∆′)
√
∆′(1−∆′)eZ(1− eZ). (D6)
In the ideal scenario, when the states |ΥZ〉ABE and |ΥX〉ABE are close to each other, ∆′ is very small and eX ≈ eZ .
By substituting Eq. (D6) into Eq. (4) and using the same definition for eZ as in Eq. (33) we are able to calculate R.
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2. Actual and virtual protocols
In this section, we describe the actual and virtual QKD protocols considered in the Lo-Preskill’s security analysis.
Note that, all announcements between Alice and Bob are done via an authenticated public channel.
Actual Protocol
1. Initialisation: Before running the protocol, Alice and Bob agree on a number Nfixed of rounds, on the error
correcting codes, and on a set of hash functions to perform privacy amplification. Steps 2-4 of the protocol are
repeated N times until the number of detected events N becomes Nfixed.
2. State preparation: Alice selects the basis β ∈ {Z,X} for encoding the states with probabilities PZA and
PXA = 1−PZA respectively. For each basis selected, she randomly chooses a bit value and the associated phase.
Then, she prepares the signal and reference pulses following these specifications and sends the state to Bob via
the quantum channel. Due to a potential THA, the sent states might contain Eve’s system.
3. Measurement: Bob measures each incoming signal using the basis β ∈ {Z,X} with probabilities PZB and
PXB = 1− PZB respectively. For each detected event, N is increased by 1 unit.
4. Detection announcement: If N = Nfixed, Bob announces the termination of the quantum communication
phase and the detection pattern. Otherwise, Alice and Bob return to Step 2 of the protocol.
5. Basis announcement and sifting: For the detected events, Alice selects the basis of the quantum coin
namely, the ZC or XC basis, with probabilities PZC and PXC = 1−PZC respectively. She announces the chosen
basis, and if ZC was selected, she also announces the selected basis in Step 2. Moreover, Bob announces his
basis choice. If Alice’s and Bob’s basis choices disagree they discard the data. Otherwise, they define bit strings
associated with the matched events, i.e., when both select the Z or both select the X basis.
6. Parameter estimation: Alice and Bob announce the bit strings in the X basis. They calculate the Hamming
weight wt(~sXA ⊕ ~sXB ) to find the number of mismatches between the two bit strings. This is then used to
estimate the number of bits that need to be removed from the sifted strings in the Z basis, ~sZA and ~sZA , during
privacy amplification.
7. Error correction and privacy amplification: Alice and Bob randomly select an error correcting code from
Step 1 to perform error correction on the sifted strings in the Z basis and then they exchange the syndrome
information. Then, by choosing a random hash function from Step 1 and based on the result of the parameter
estimation in Step 6, they perform privacy amplification on the corrected sifted keys. At the end, Alice and
Bob obtain the key ~kZA and
~kZB , respectively.
Virtual Protocol
In Lo-Preskill’s work, they consider only basis matched events therefore, in the virtual protocol we need to include a
post-selection that will only choose these events. This can be done by flipping a classical coin C ′ that selects between
the basis matched and mismatched events. The probability that C ′ = 0 (1) is Pmatched (Pmismatched), associated with
the basis matched (mismatched) event chosen by Bob. A diagram of the virtual protocol with this post-selection is
depicted in Fig. 6. Also, all announcements between Alice and Bob are done via an authenticated public channel.
The steps of the protocol are as follows:
1. Initialisation: Before running the protocol, Alice and Bob agree on a number Nfixed of rounds, on the error
correcting codes, and on a set of hash functions to perform privacy amplification. Steps 2-5 of the protocol are
repeated until the number of detected events N becomes Nfixed.
2. Probabilistic choice of the basis matched and mismatched events: Bob measures the classical coin C ′
and obtains the results “0” or “1”, which correspond to basis matched and mismatched events, respectively.
3. State Preparation: After a potential THA, Alice prepares systems in the entangled state in Eq. (D3) and
sends Bob the system BE via a quantum channel.
4. QND measurement: For each incoming system, Bob performs a quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement
to determine whether the signal is detected or not. If Bob obtains a detection event he keeps the resulting system
and N is increased by 1 unit.
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5. Detection announcement: If N = Nfixed, Bob announces the termination of the quantum communication
phase and the detection pattern. Otherwise Alice and Bob return to Step 2 of the protocol.
6. Measurement and basis announcement: For the detected events, Alice measures the quantum coin with the
ZC basis or the XC basis, chosen with probabilities PZC and PXC = 1−PZC respectively. Then, she announces
the chosen basis. If ZC is selected she also announces the measurement outcome (the Z or the X basis), however,
she always measures system A with the X basis. As for Bob, if C ′ = 0 (1) in Step 2 he announces the same
(opposite) basis that was announced by Alice, however, he always measures his system with the X basis.
7. Sifting and announcement: Alice and Bob announce the bit string in the X basis, which corresponds to the
events when C ′ = 0 and ZC = 1.
Bob	flips	
coin	C’
QND
Pmatched
Pmismatched
C’ =	0
C’ =	1
no	click
click
Discarded	
Alice	selects
ZC or	XC
XC = 0
XC = 1
ZA		, XB	
XA		, ZB	
PXC
PZC
Alice	and	Bob	measure	
their	systems	in	the	X basis	
QND
no	click
click
Discarded	
Alice	selects
ZC or	XC
Alice	
measures	
the	coin	C
ZA		, ZB	
XA		, XB	
PXC
PZC
XC = 0
XC = 1
Alice	
measures	
the	coin	C
FIG. 6: The logical schematics for the virtual protocol. It is the use of a second coin that allows us to pre-select only
the matched events. When Alice selects the Z basis to measure the coin C she prepares the state |ΥZ〉 or |ΥX〉, but
in the virtual protocol she always measures in the X basis.
In this virtual protocol, Alice’s and Bob’s measurements are postponed because it is useful to clearly define the
outcomes of each run of the protocol. Note that, in Step 6 Alice employs the X basis for the measurement, and
this is required for the estimation of the phase error rate. It can be seen that the classical and quantum information
available to Eve is the same in both the actual and virtual protocols, and also the key generated is identical therefore,
the virtual protocol can be used to prove the security of the QKD scheme.
3. Simulation of the key rate for the Lo-Preskill’s analysis with imperfectly characterised states
In this section, we evaluate Lo-Preskill’s analysis for the particular device model described in Section IV. Since it
considers the BB84 protocol [39], Alice sends Bob the three states in Eq. (3) and another state in the X basis, which
we assume to be
|ω1X〉B = cos
(
3pi
4
+
3δ
4
)
|0Z〉+ sin
(
3pi
4
+
3δ
4
)
|1Z〉 . (D7)
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This state is obtained by following the same device model as that given in Eq. (2) for ϕA = 3pi/2, i.e., the phase
modulation is proportional to the chosen phase value (see Section II for more details).
In order to estimate the phase error rate we use the coin imbalance ∆′, Eq. (32) and Eq. (D6). To calculate the
secret key rate R we use Eq. (4), where the yield of single photons in the Z basis is YZ = PZAPZB
[
4(1 − η2 )pd + η
]
for overall transmission efficiency η and the bit error rate is defined in Eq. (33). For simplicity, we assume the
probabilities PZC → 1, PZA = PZB = 12 and for fair comparisons, we use the same channel model used to evaluate the
generalised loss-tolerant protocol (see Appendix E) and the same experimental parameters. As before, we analyse each
of the different source imperfections separately to evaluate how they affect the key generation rate. These are: SPFs
parametrised by δ, the phase modulation deviation; the non-qubit assumption where θjβ is the mode dependency;
and a THA which depends on the intensity of the back-reflected light µ. The results are shown below.
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FIG. 7: Asymptotic secret key rate R against the overall system loss measured in dB, for different values of δ,
dependent and independent θ, and µ, using the Lo-Preskill’s analysis with imperfectly characterised states. The
blue and red curves coincide in some graphs. (a) As the SPF δ increases, R decreases rapidly. (b) As the setting
independent θ gets larger, the component of vertical polarisation increases and R decreases. (c) When θjβ is setting
dependent the key rate R decreases even further. (d) As the intensity of Eve’s back-reflected light µ increases, more
information is leaked causing R to decrease.
In Fig. 7(a) we can see how δ greatly affects the secret key rate R as it increases. The explanation for this lies
in the fact that Lo-Preskill’s method assumes the worst case scenario, namely, the detected signals are chosen to
maximise the imbalance of the coin. This assumption is required since not all signals emitted by Alice are detected,
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thus Eve can exploit these losses to enhance the basis dependence of the detected signals without being exposed.
These results contrast with the generalised loss-tolerant protocol, as shown in Fig. 2(a), where R remains almost the
same independently of δ.
Fig. 7(b) evaluates the setting independent θ, that is, when θ is independent of Alice’s encoding. As θ increases
the key rate is approximately the same but for values of θ ' 10−4 it starts to decrease. However, when we compare
it with Fig. 2(b) we see that it decreases slower than in the generalised loss-tolerant protocol. When we consider a
setting dependent θjβ instead, the R deteriorates even further, as shown in Fig. 7(c). This result is expected since
Eve is now able to better distinguish the states sent by Alice.
Finally, in Fig. 7(d) we can see how the THA affects the secret key rate. An increase in µ results in a lower R but,
it decreases at a slower rate when compared with the generalised loss-tolerant protocol in Fig. 2(d). As observed, no
key can be obtained around µ ' 10−3 and the secret key rate is roughly the same for values of µ / 10−8.
From these results we can conclude that the Lo-Preskill’s analysis is highly affected by SPF but it is more resistant
to the non-qubit assumption and THA when compared to the generalised loss-tolerant protocol. In order to see this
comparison more clearly we refer the reader back to Section IV.
Appendix E: Channel model
The three states sent by Alice in Eq. (3) can be expressed in terms of creation operators as follows
|ω0Z〉B =
1√
2
(aˆ†r + aˆ
†
s) |v〉 ,
|ω1Z〉B =
1√
2
(aˆ†r − eiδaˆ†s) |v〉 ,
|ω0X〉B =
1√
2
(aˆ†r + ie
iδ/2aˆ†s) |v〉 ,
(E1)
where aˆ†r and aˆ
†
s are creation operators for a photon in the reference and signal pulses respectively. Using these states,
we can simulate the QKD protocol as shown in Fig. (1). We assume that the detectors D0 and D1 have the same
detection efficiency and that the dark counts pd are independent of the incoming signals. The overall transmission
efficiency of the system can be expressed as η = ηchannelηdetector, where ηchannel = 10
−αl/10, α in dB/Km is the
fiber loss coefficient and l is transmission distance in Km. Note that, only half of the pulses interfere in Bob’s lab.
Furthermore, we do not assume misalignment in the channel. For simplicity, the non-qubit assumption and the THA
are not included in this model because we assume that they are not affected by the channel. By neglecting the terms
associated with p2d, the results obtained are
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